



New South Wales Government
Independent Planning Commission

TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING

**RE: PORT BOTANY QUAYLINE EQUALISATION PROJECT
(SSI-79878464)**

COMMUNITY MEMBER MEETING

PANEL: ANDREW MILLS (Chair)

OFFICE OF THE IPC: KENDALL CLYDSDALE
TAHLIA HUTCHINSON

COMMUNITY MEMBER: BELLA GLENNY

LOCATION: ZOOM VIDEOCONFERENCE

DATE & TIME: 2:15PM – 3.00PM
TUESDAY, 1st SEPTEMBER 2026

<THE MEETING COMMENCED

MR ANDREW MILLS: Okay. Excellent. Thank you. All right. So, let's begin. Welcome. Before I begin though, I'd like to acknowledge that I'm speaking to you from Gadigal land and I'd like to acknowledge the traditional custodians of the lands from which we virtually meet together. And I pay my respects to their Elders past and present.

So, welcome to the meeting to discuss the Port Botany Quayline Equalisation state significant infrastructure application currently before the Commission for determination. The Applicant, Port Botany Operations Pty Ltd as Trustee for the Port Botany Unit Trust, is seeking consent to construct an extended quayline on the southern side of Brotherson Dock and reclaim land adjacent to the extended quayline, demolish the existing bulk liquids berth (BLB1) and associated pipeline infrastructure, and construct and operate a new bulk liquids berth (BLB3) and the associated pipeline and bulk liquids handling infrastructure.

My name is Andrew Mills. I am Chair of the Independent Planning Commission and of this single-member panel. And we are joined by Kendall Clydsdale and Tahlia Hutchinson from the office of the Independent Planning Commission.

In the interests of openness and transparency and to ensure the full capture of information, today's meeting is being recorded, and a complete transcript will be produced and made available on the Commission's website.

This meeting is one of the Commission's considerations in this matters and will form one of several sources of information upon which the Commission will base its determination.

We've set aside 45 minutes today to hear your views and allow the Commission to ask questions. So, I'd like to begin. I'd like to first of all acknowledge both the email that you sent and the originally and the submission that you sent this morning. We have both of those, they will both be taken into consideration as part of our deliberations. So, don't be concerned about the timing – I know that there were difficulties in uploading, not sure whether it was – you were overseas, I believe, at the time, or whether it was at our end because we were receiving a lot of submissions in relation to other matters that we're handling as well. So, whatever reason, it doesn't matter, we've got your submission. We had already started reading it carefully, the longer one, obviously we had the other one earlier, and that will definitely be taken into consideration as part of our considerations.

But I'd like to hand over to you, if I may, if you'd like to talk to the – what I think are probably two broad subject areas that you've identified in your objections.

MS BELLA GLENNY: Okay. I am actually going to – I had prepared a lovely spiel and woke up this morning quite happy with my spiel, under the impression that you had received my submission which went into great detail, and I assume we were working on that. Now, I've discovered that you haven't actually seen that as yet –

MR MILLS: Well, actually, [cross-talk 00:04:00].

MS GLENNY: Yes, but probably are not able to have absorbed the information within, so I am actually now completely changing my format. So, I apologise in advance that this is going to be very off-the-cuff, because I'm trying to work with the fact that you will not have been fully aware.

I also would like to just acknowledge that, having arrived back on Saturday and most of the documents for the IPCN have been loaded, sort of, you know, council documents, submissions, a lot of the documents have been loaded on the last few days. And I've been desperately trying to go through those, some this morning, in order for this. So, I apologise for my level. Anyway.

The basic issue is that aircraft crash into gas and fuel ships docked at BLB3 has not been assessed. This is a new risk, as previously at BLB1 they were not under the flight path. Now they are. Obviously, if you move something from not under a flight path to under a flight path, that incredibly increases potential risk. Now, I'm not against the port, it has to enlarge, it's the lifeblood of NSW. What I am concerned about is that appropriate assessment is done for hazard and risk, and it hasn't.

The ships carry highly volatile dangerous goods, 2.1, DG2.1 and DG3. Now, very important that DG2.1 and DG3 is something that you hold in your head. Because these are gasoline, petrol and aviation fuel, so highly volatile and highly flammable. Ships that weren't under the flight path now are. So, clearly an increased risk.

Issues why they were not covered – I'm going to go into this in terribly brief detail because I'm just trying to get not disappear in detail so that you get lost to the issue. SEARs stipulated, "Land based issues." So, all the hazard and safety kind of were land-based issues. So, from the start, planning put in something which has caused a problem later on. Of course, marine, which is ships, don't fall under that.

Both the assessors, the aviation safety – ah, no, I'll start with the hazard analysis risk, specifically said we've adhered to what we've been asked to do; land-based structures. These are not land-based structures. So, they've covered the infrastructure, they've covered at BLB3, the pipes that go along the ground, the minimal infrastructure that sticks up, have been covered. But the ships, which are this huge protrusion upwards underneath flights, has not.

Further concern with that, the nature, hazard analysis, is that a couple of times the assessor specifically mentioned that aircraft do not fly over the port. So, you know, she's under the impression – sorry, the person has assessed that aircraft do not fly over the port. They do. And in my submission, you can see they do. In my submission, you can see and, you know, I might refer you at this early stage to some of the images in my assessment if you all have that.

MR MILLS: We do.

MS GLENNY: On page 4, oh sorry, page 3, are you able to access that?

MR MILLS: Yes, yes, yes.

MS GLENNY: Page 3 shows the aircraft flying over BLB3. Now, those were on the day I wrote my submission – October the 13th. This happens all the time. So, be under no illusion, that happens. If you look at page 4, you see where BLB3 is located. You can see it's directly under those aeroplanes.

If you look at page 7, sorry I'm flicking through quick, again, but I think an image is worth a thousand words, whatever the term is, you see the Sydney Airport long-term flight path for non-jet aircraft specifically, primarily going over BLB3. So, the assessor's rejection of there being rules that don't allow flights to go over is just not correct, and this is majorly, majorly concerning.

If you go to – and bear in mind that at the port, major hazard facilities, some of the main major hazard facilities exist. So, very, very, very dangerous place, that port. The propagation effect, now it's the L-gas cavern, LPG cavern underneath the port at that point. If that was to go up for a propagation effect, you know, this part of Sydney would be wiped out, basically. So, this is not something I take on lightly.

I'm not an expert in hazard risk. What I am an expert in is where the aircraft fly and local issues, and that's why I've come to this.

The LPG, if you look at page 11, I'm just, you know, visually, so you really do get a feeling for it, page 11 of my submission. You can see the results of an LPG explosion. Now, that explosion as they say was like a nuclear bomb going off in Cairns.

MR CLYDSDALE: Ms Glenny, can you hear us? It appears you've frozen on our screen. Tahlia, does her connection still look okay in the waiting room? Ms Glenny, if you can hear us, it might be that you need to leave the room and join again, that might help you. You are frozen on our end.

MR MILLS: It appears that she has left.

MR CLYDSDALE: Just for the recording, we'll just note that Ms Glenny's internet dropped out and we'll just pause the recording.

MR MILLS: Hello, Ms Glenny.

MS GLENNY: Hello, hi, I hope that you can hear me okay on this.

MR MILLS: We can hear you perfectly well, thank you.

MS GLENNY: Lovely. I'd just like to add, my computer went down. There is no reason why that should have happened. I'm afraid I get very concerned about when I'm dealing with large corporations and large vested interests. Enough said. I will continue on phone.

MR MILLS: Please do.

MS GLENNY: I'm not sure what point you were at before I was cut out, and then my –

MR MILLS: You were just taking us through some of the photos that were contained in your submission.

MS GLENNY: Yes. Had you got to, so I'd suggested ...

MR MILLS: Page 10 was the last one I think you mentioned.

MS GLENNY: Sorry?

MR MILLS: Page 10 was the last one you mentioned.

MS GLENNY: Okay. Is that the one that records a couple of crashes?

MR MILLS: That's right, yes.

MS GLENNY: So, and that was the one in 1994. Now, just with reference to that, they've been six incidents at Sydney Airport over the last six weeks. We have issues, there are issues for air services with the air traffic controllers at the moment due to moving them to Melbourne, then to Parramatta, then to North Sydney. And, you know, we have had six incidents.

MR MILLS: Yes.

MS GLENNY: I think that does need to be borne in mind. The incidents – crashes do happen, have actually happened at the end of the airport, you know, when they were taking off. These things do happen.

Page 11 shows, if you have a look at that, shows the result of an LPG explosion. And that was again about 30 years ago, and that is about what the ships, I believe, hold. So, that explosion if it goes into a ship, that sort of explosion could well have a propagation effect. So, I'm just trying to give level of what it is. The gas cavern, I think, carries about 3,000 times as much. So, if you can imagine an explosion from that. I'm not sure of that particular detail.

If you see page 11, that shows that air services admit their flights go over BLB3. You can see on the right-hand side, those flights. So, this, it is under no doubt, and my concern is that the assessor was not aware of that; that flights do go over, and they don't go over the current port, they don't go over the current position, BLB1. It virtually never would happen that they'd go over BLB1. So, you are changing something, in saying "you" I'm saying they are changing something, the BLB3, which is an utterly different risk scenario.

Now, in the claim that they did assess the risk of aircraft crash. When you look at what they're actually saying, it was for the actual container port. So, they were assessing the risk of aircraft crash in a place where the aircrafts don't go. They were assessing them for goods that did not include those dangerous goods 2.1 and 3, because they're not there at the container port. So, they weren't assessing crashing into goods with volatile fuels. And this is my real, real concern with this.

Additionally, there were very sort of upsetting issues. It was very, very confused, the two documents, the aviation safety and the document for risk analysis. So, it was very difficult – I read the documents again and again and again and again, I’m probably more familiar with them than anybody. Trying to say, well, what exactly are they saying here. Because the words used did not clearly rules things in and out.

But eventually I realise from things like the fact that when they do the scenarios, they don’t mention dangerous goods 2.1 don’t mention dangerous goods 3, that they weren’t assessing those ships. They were assessing the container port, which is a totally different risk scenario.

Further concerning was when I looked at submissions, after the submissions, CASA had not identified any of this. So, I contacted CASA and contacted the Air Traffic Safety Bureau who kind of referred me onto CASA, and they were concerned about this issue. They suddenly realised that this is an issue that had gone under their radar, literally, because the documents were so confusing. So, the second submission from CASA actually lists some of the things of concern that should have been assessed. But even that document from CASA, if you have that document which is CASA’s Response to Submissions Response, you realise that CASA still have not taken on board the fact that it’s the BLB3 and the dangerous goods 2.1 and 3 haven’t been assessed. So, they are still under the impression that that scenario has been assessed, when it hasn’t, clearly.

Another concern with it, so repeatedly, I mean, I can’t – I’m just all over the place, I realise this. But this is a result of today, realising that my prepared thing was a complete waste of time because you hadn’t had my document.

MR MILLS: Perhaps I [cross-talk 00:17:15].

MS GLENNY: Sorry?

MR MILLS: Sorry. I was just going to say it might help for me just to note that we’re conscious of this issue and we have written to the Department asking them specifically to advise us in relation to this issue.

MS GLENNY: Please, please [cross-talk 00:17:37].

MR MILLS: Now, that letter is on our website as well, so you’re able to see that.

MS GLENNY: Okay. I didn’t see that. Please be advised though, please do not have all pulled over or whatever is going on here. Because it is very specifically – they may say, “Oh yes, we did assess it, here is where we assessed it.” And you will find it does not mention DG2.1 and 3 because it has been taken on the container scenario. And this was one of the faults with the assessment, that they split it into several different operations. So, one of them they called “the project” which then becomes very confusing, all through the documents, when they mentioned the project, are they talking about the project generally, which is sometimes what they refer to, or are they referring to the project which actually means the construction part of the issue.

So, there's confusion over the use of the word "project" and often it's very difficult when they say, "the project," you know, "this was an effect in the project," what they actually mean is in the construction part of the project, not the project generally. So, this was a whole other level of confusion. So, they basically cover the following issues very clearly, make them different, the project, which is the construction, that is also the whole project.

Then there's number two, the "facilitated container port" is what they say. Now, this is where the issue comes. Often, risk assessments of the facilitated container port are then sort of implied that they are actually the BLB3 ships that are being assessed. No. They're not. And you can tell by which dangerous goods are being sort of referred to.

The third thing they assessed so that, you know, is speaking to these three sort of areas. The third thing was the BLB infrastructure. Now, on the whole the BLB infrastructure, so again you kind of, because this assessment is meant to cover the operation of BLB3, when you see stuff about the BLB infrastructure, you go, well, considering it's the operation that's being approved in this DA, obviously they would cover the ships. But no, the BLB infrastructure seems to be the low-level pipes that go along the ground carrying the dangerous goods, and, you know, the goods that they aren't actually connecting up to the boats. It doesn't cover the boats.

Now, CASA sort of highlight that in their, you know, they do in their response to the response, when they were alerted about this, they do mention that the ship heights, the ship's size, the manoeuvring in and out, the frequency etc., has not been covered. They do mention that.

And then the fourth area which is sort of the, is the operation. The existence of ships are not land-based structures, so again, is pulled into this area of the Department of Planning, their documents basically cover land-based issues.

We move onto the Aviation Report. Again, the Aviation Report clearly states that the ships are exempt, they are not in the National Airports Safety Framework (NASF). So, they do their assessment according to NASF Guidelines, which are very clear. But in the airport fact, ships are not covered. So, the Aviation Safety says we haven't done ships. Similarly, they haven't done turbulence from ships.

So, all these major issues have been exempt.

I'd also like to go into the fact that, so if you look at the CASA response again, the CASA response down the bottom sort of lists the whole things that weren't done, don't pick up on the fact that the crash was into the container port, not into the BLB3 and the associated risks of that and propagation to other major hazard facilities.

If you also look at the CASA thing, at the bottom they said, ooh, they also didn't contact the airlines. Well, you've got aircraft flying over which hasn't been assessed because the assessment has not realised that aircraft fly over, you know, the risk analysis has not realised aircraft don't fly over. So, airlines haven't been contacted.

So, CASA then did a quick check with a couple of the airlines. One airline clearly wasn't understanding what CASA was saying and was just confusing it might be

aircraft coming in and aircraft coming out. The other airline basically said, you know, mentioned, well, perhaps you need to avoid this risk, you need to change the airline flight path.

5 So, this is how much this issue hasn't been kind of looked at. For that to be coming out in a CASA sort of response to submission and not have come out right at the beginning, it just shows this is a mess. This is a real mess, of not being covered.

10 If it is covered, please tell me. If I have somehow missed or misinterpreted such confusing documents, not because of the – I don't query the analysis that was done, it was fabulous, and totally appropriate, if they had been analysed, you know, if it had been covering that hazard.

15 Another concern is that the port is full of major hazard facilities. We have this additional risk of aircraft that hasn't been assessed, but what also hasn't happened is SafeWork. There's nothing from SafeWork. Why is there nothing from SafeWork? This would seem to be a major thing. If SafeWork, if it went under the radar for them, surely Planning should have followed up with SafeWork. This is a major, major hazard facility, so their bread and butter. They are the people who maintain it.

20 So, you would think that anything that affected major hazard facilities, including a ship being put there underneath the flight path, which basically it is, ships are major hazard facilities in themselves, but a propagation effect is even more to affect them. You would think that would all have been there. It's not.

25 Sorry, I mean, I can go on and on and it's all very garbled, but ...

MR MILLS: No, it's not garbled at all, and you're very clear, in fact, in the point that you're making.

30 **MS GLENNY:** Okay.

MR MILLS: [Cross-talk 00:24:13]

35 **MS GLENNY:** As CASA pointed out – sorry. As CASA pointed out, Runway 16L, they are told, flights are told that at 500 feet, you turn right, and you turn right to meet, you have to fly over something sort of between the Heads, to the north side of the Heads. Now, depending on when you reach 500 feet, aviation instruction to right, depends on whether you fly over the port or not. So, most of the jet aircraft don't fly
40 over the port. Some do. Occasionally, they do. But most or a large proportion of the non-jet aircraft fly over BLB3.

MR MILLS: Is that because – sorry, if I could – is that because they haven't reached 500 feet and so therefore they are flying in that direction –

45 **MS GLENNY:** That's right.

MR MILLS: – [cross-talk 00:25:08] can reach 500 feet.

5 **MS GLENNY:** It takes a jet aircraft longer to turn. So, often they have reached 500 feet before the end of a runway and they may start to turn, but presumably there is more slowness in that, being smaller aircraft reach 500 feet much earlier, they turn, that's where they go, and they turn to get out of the way of the larger aircraft. So, on the whole, the jet aircraft are less likely to go over the hazard facilities. I'm not sure whether I included it in my submission –

10 **MR MILLS:** Now, I'm getting confused with some of the picture. So, I just want to dwell on this for just a second if I might.

MS GLENNY: Yes, please do.

15 **MR MILLS:** Because if they're travelling south and they're turning right, then they're turning away from the port.

MS GLENNY: Sorry, turning left. Did I say right? I'm sorry. I might have made a mistake [cross-talk 00:26:00].

20 **MR MILLS:** That's why I was getting confused. I thought you said, yes.

MS GLENNY: Oh, I apologise for that. Left. Left.

MR MILLS: Right, okay.

25 **MS GLENNY:** So, the picture on page 3, you can see, that is the regular flight. You have two pictures – one at 6/21, one at 7/17, I could have gone on. I could have taken any day, I could have gone on. That's where they fly.

30 **MR MILLS:** Okay. No, thank you, that clarifies [cross-talk 00:26:25].

MS GLENNY: If you go to page, oh, whatever it is ...

35 **MR MILLS:** I'm looking at, page 11 has some of the material that's actually come from Sydney Airport or Air Services.

MS GLENNY: Yes. If you look at page 11 then, you can see that the picture on the right, which is flight path, it's non-jet aircraft in 2024, you can see they are going over that area. You see they all go over BLB3.

40 **MR MILLS:** Yes. Okay.

45 **MS GLENNY:** You see great swathe of lines over BLB3. That is what they are expected to do, that is what they do. If you look at the earlier one, which is the picture next to it, which says, "Jet aircraft, 2024", you can see that there is a large swathe that just do go over the end of that. So, the odd one, you probably can't see very well in that diagram, but you are getting the odd aircraft that is going directly over as well, or they are going right beside.

50 Now, in the instant of an accident happening, it happens very quick, because it's at low altitude. So, take-off is the most dangerous time, well, actually, landing is the most

dangerous time. But take-off is one of the most dangerous times of aircraft flight, because you're powering up, if any of those engines fail, you have got minutes, sorry, you've got seconds to avoid a catastrophe, because you're very close at low altitude.

5 If you have a bird strike, and there are birds around, there's a bird sanctuary very close within a couple of kilometres. So, if you have a bird strike, you have got seconds for that to happen. If you have up-turbulence from anything, including a ship underneath. If you have any sort of turbulence, you have seconds.

10 This is why the placing of a port is very far, and major hazard facilities, is very, very far from ideal. But on the whole, the risk factor hasn't been there because we haven't had a big structure in that flight path. Now, we're putting a big structure in that flight path.

15 **MR MILLS:** Okay. Thank you. Did you want to –

MS GLENNY: Another problem with – one very quick problem with that as well, is bear in mind this is an intermittent hazard. So, a pilot who has flown there all these years, quite happy, getting used to fly, suddenly comes across this hazard, you know, this huge ship, and it's like, ah, I haven't seen that before, because it's an intermittent hazard. That wasn't there yesterday.

20 So, to me, an intermittent hazard makes an increased issue. And, you know, nothing on turbulence has been covered because it's sort of deemed, one, it's a land-based structure so turbulence doesn't have to be assessed; two, it's very slightly out of the official turbulence area. But if that was a land-based structure, there'd be huge amounts of things that had to be filled in to have that structure there, and assessments etc.

25 Yes, sorry, do you have – yes, the SafeWork is the other thing that's really concerning.

MR MILLS: I imagine that as well –

MS GLENNY: The other issue is – sorry, one other thing is the risk, I'm sorry I'm a lot of ... The risk of, you know, it's quoted as one in billions of years. Well, we have two air course crashes into Botany Bay over the last 50 years. We have Kentucky, the recent issue. We've had six accidents on the tarmac due to, you know, presumably the stresses that air traffic controllers are going through at the moment. So, one in a billion years is irrelevant, and that was anyway applied to the container port where the aircrafts don't fly, so that is one in a billion years because they don't fly there. So, if one plane in a year flies over, well then it probably does equate to one in a billion years.

40 So, this is my concern. I'm not a safety person. I don't make the determination whether this happens and goes ahead or not. But I do, as a member of the public, insist is that a safety assessment, a proper safety assessment is done.

MR MILLS: Look, I just want to, in the interest of time, I wanted to make sure that we've heard you in relation to the contamination issue as well.

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MS GLENNY: I can't cover that with ... This issue is so much more critical.

MR MILLS: Okay.

5 **MS GLENNY:** Contamination, the issues of contamination, the EPA definitely try, they valiantly put forward lots of stuff about contamination. I have very little faith that any of that will be addressed, that the EPA's putting forward, because I've seen the operation of such a system before. All they can do is put forward their concerns and try and get the best possible thing.

10 With contamination, no detailed site investigation has been done. Well, I have some experiences of marine contamination because I work with an EPA site auditor who has specialisation in marine contamination, and on a project also in the bay. And clearly, I think if you gave it to an independent site auditor, they would have a field day with this. No detailed site investigation was done, which, given the contamination in Botany Bay, is just completely bizarre.

15 Given the fact that probably the biggest PFAS contamination in the whole of Australia is on the edge of a port site, on the edge of Sydney Airport, and yet that is something that has completely gone under the radar. There are 28 licensed activities under the POE Act within a kilometre of the project area. There are 12 contaminated sites relevant to the project area and notified to the EPA. These are all serious contamination exposure in the thing.

20 There was a chemical spill of 130,000 litres of petrol within Port Botany from VORTAC. There's Orica contamination of the aquifer, mercury and all sorts of contamination in the aquifer deliberately beneath. And I notice in the report, words like "contamination areas of interest have been limited adjacent or topographically upgradient and within 500 metres of the project." So, words like that are words I don't exactly what they mean. "Adjacent or topographically upgradient." Presumably, the aquifer, which is seriously contaminated, hasn't been considered. Don't know why. That would have implications.

25 The Contamination Report. At one stage, one of the reports did two locations in Brotherson Dock. The whole of Brotherson Dock is being dredged – ah, not dredging, you know, excavated. And there are only two locations sampled, and that was meant to show that therefore there wasn't contamination.

30 The sediment infestations, were they done, you know, one of the sectors 7 were done at 0.2 metres when the dredging is to 4.5, and there's legacy contamination. So, this leads to false conclusions that there will be no risk to humans.

35 In some of the documents, right early on, it was called "capital dredging". But then suddenly it's become "maintenance dredging," which comes under a whole set of different requirements; 4.5 metres being removed, 600,000 cubic metres of dredged material to a depth of 4.5 metres is being extracted to make it bigger/deeper for bigger ships. And that was acknowledged in one place in the 3,000-page report. It was acknowledged that it was to make it deeper for bigger ships, so this isn't maintenance dredging. This is capital dredging, and that's a whole different sort of thing.

But I really don't want to go into all that because the real critical issue – and normally I would, normally I'd like to assess noise impacts, I'd like to assess a whole thing that's going to affect our local community. But I'm not. I'm going for the critical thing that I'd like to see done.

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Yes. Incorrect screening levels were used for multiple contaminants of concern. Well, that's really concerning that they're using and putting in reports incorrect screening levels. The sediment plume. The beach most likely to be affected by the sediment plume is Frenchman's Beach. And on their beaches, where they recognise all the beaches in the area, Frenchman's Beach isn't on that map. Even though thousands of people come in summer to that beach.

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This is the level of my concern, and I just can't go into it now.

15

MR MILLS: That's all right. We do have, we've got the details in your submission, which is quite substantial.

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MS GLENNY: Yes, I didn't go into all of it. I didn't go into all of it in the submission, because I really wanted to focus on the thing. But if you look at the EPA and their concerns, and you look at my submission and my concerns, it gives you some indication. Yes.

MR MILLS: Yes. Thank you for that.

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MS GLENNY: Yes.

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MR MILLS: Thank you very much. There's an enormous amount of detail that you provided in the submission as I've been going through it, and as I say, well, I hadn't finished it before this meeting, we will definitely be making sure we read it all very carefully, again.

35

MS GLENNY: Yes. I think it's very, very difficult. As I say, there's 3,000 pages in the submission. It's a huge number. And then we've got further documents. And the problem is that words can be used, you know, CASA missed this stuff, I don't blame CASA. The documents are so difficult to determine. The words used make it look like something has been covered. When you get down to the bottom of it, you read it again, again and again, you go, "Oh, yes, actually, that hasn't, does not appear to have been covered."

40

And then there are just the triggers like the hazard analysis document where the assessor is under the impression that no flights go over Port Botany. So, you know, that's kind of ... Yes.

45

MR MILLS: Yes, no, no, we understand the points you're making.

MS GLENNY: Yes.

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MR MILLS: Okay. Thank you, thank you for giving us the very detailed submission as well, and for this meeting today. If there's anything else you'd like to let us know about before we close ...

MS GLENNY: No.

MR MILLS: Okay. Happy, that's great.

MS GLENNY: No.

MR MILLS: As I said, we've got the submission, we've got the benefit of this discussion, which has been recorded. A transcript, as I said earlier, a transcript will be made available on our website as well.

MS GLENNY: Yes.

MR MILLS: And we're very grateful for the efforts that you've gone to in drawing these things to our attention. So, thank you for doing that.

MS GLENNY: Thank you. And I hope that, you know, I hope that this risk analysis is done, and I hope that the analysis that is done is not, is in-depth and appropriate, and I just have to trust to that. And thank you for your time. I'm sorry about the interruption. I have no idea why my computer would go down, but it did.

MR MILLS: Technology does break down.

MS GLENNY: On that note, I will leave it.

MR MILLS: We'll draw it to a close. Thank you. Thank you again, appreciate your time.

MS GLENNY: Thanks. But please, please, sorry, one last, last thing. Please refer to the CASA document.

MR MILLS: Yes.

MS GLENNY: Please question why major hazard facilities, why there was not a submission from ... My brain is ...

MR MILLS: Yes, okay.

MS GLENNY: Thank you.

MR MILLS: Will do. All right.

MS GLENNY: And please be aware that CASA has not still fully understood the depth of concern that the – it is not in a billion years, I have no idea, but that's what they're claiming in the report it appeared to say a million years, but we had crashes into Botany Bay, we have an ongoing issue with six in six weeks which involve an air traffic controllers which is of concern, ongoing.

MR MILLS: Yes.

MS GLENNY: Thank you very much.

MR MILLS: Thank you.

5 **MS GLENNY:** Thanks. Bye-bye.

MR MILLS: Bye.

>THE MEETING CONCLUDED