Steel River East Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)

25681

Save Our Surroundings Riverina

04/03/2026

Object

Email

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Department of Planning, Housing and Infrastructure (DPHI) recommendation of approval for this 200MW / 400MWh lithium-ion Battery Energy Storage System is deeply flawed. The proposed conditions (B31–B37, C1–C14): Defer critical safety design until after consent. Contain sweeping Planning Secretary discretion clauses. Omit mandatory toxic plume modelling. Exclude the Fire Safety Study and Emergency Plan from public disclosure. Require no independent peer review of hazard modelling. Impose no financial assurance or contamination bond. Provide no cybersecurity safeguards. Allow staged dilution of safeguards without full consultation. Rely on outdated hazardous industry thresholds (SEPP 33 framework). Fail to reflect contemporary global battery fire evidence. The DPHI assessment materially understates: Thermal runaway escalation risk. Hydrogen fluoride and heavy metal deposition risk. Firewater contamination pathways. Cumulative grid-scale battery clustering risk. Cyber-physical infrastructure vulnerability. Approval under these conditions would be contrary to: The Precautionary Principle. Intergenerational Equity. Section 4.15 EP&A Act considerations. The public interest. 2. FIRE SAFETY – POST-CONSENT DEFERRAL IS UNLAWFUL IN SUBSTANCE Condition B31 + FRNSW Confirmation Mechanism Construction cannot commence until Fire and Rescue NSW confirms the Fire Safety Study is satisfactory. This is presented as protection. It is not. The Commission is being asked to approve a high-density lithium-ion chemical facility without knowing the final engineered fire controls. That reverses the precautionary principle. FRNSW itself states: “There is a general lack of guidance and provisions in building codes, standards and legislation… we do not yet know enough about probability of failure, mechanisms of failure and consequences.” The Department cannot lawfully claim risk is acceptable while simultaneously acknowledging that regulatory knowledge gaps exist. 3. GLOBAL EVIDENCE – MOSS LANDING FIRE The 2025 Moss Landing mega-battery fire (USA) demonstrated: Multi-day thermal runaway. Re-ignition. Heavy metal deposition in coastal wetlands. Elevated concentrations of battery cathode metals in surrounding ecosystems. Peer-reviewed findings in Scientific Reports (“Coastal wetland deposition of cathode metals from the world’s largest lithium-ion battery fire”) confirm measurable environmental deposition following the event. Media and environmental testing reports documented: Elevated toxic metals in Elkhorn Slough wetlands. Community concern regarding contamination spread. Fire suppression challenges. The DPHI assessment contains no modelling of: Cathode metal plume dispersion. Wetland deposition pathways. Hunter estuary ecological exposure. This omission is indefensible given proximity to: Kooragang Nature Reserve The site sits within a flood-influenced industrial corridor draining toward estuarine systems. The conditions require runoff interception. They do not require plume deposition modelling. 4. TOXIC CHEMISTRY – PFAS AND “FOREVER CHEMICALS” Recent reporting (The Guardian, July 2024) identified PFAS-related compounds in lithium-ion battery components. PFOS-related chemicals remain in global production. The Commonwealth has banned certain PFAS (effective 1 July 2025). Yet: No PFAS testing regime is mandated. No post-fire soil testing triggers are specified. No groundwater monitoring wells are required. No contamination bond is imposed. Given the historic contamination of the site, overlaying PFAS-related risk without mandated testing is reckless 5. GRID-SCALE BATTERY FIRE SCIENCE Peer-reviewed research (“Safety of Grid-Scale Lithium-ion Battery Energy Storage Systems”) warns: Explosion potential at mega-scale. Limited engineering standards. Suppression complexity beyond conventional brigade capacity. The DPHI assessment relies on: 10m fire breaks. Water supply provisions. Internal access. These are perimeter controls. They are not chemical suppression guarantees. There is no requirement for: Worst-case hydrogen fluoride atmospheric modelling. Overpressure modelling. Cumulative cell propagation modelling. Independent fire engineering peer review. The Commission is asked to assume compliance equals safety. It does not. 6. CYBER AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RISK – COMPLETELY IGNORED The facility is digitally controlled and grid-connected. Recent international reporting (PBS, Reuters) has identified: Chinese-linked cyber targeting of energy infrastructure. Rogue communication devices in Chinese inverters. US blacklisting of battery manufacturers over military links. There is: No cybersecurity certification requirement. No sovereign component assurance. No remote disablement audit. No independent cyber review. No coordination requirement with national security agencies. The consent conditions are silent. In 2026, that silence is indefensible. 7. EXCLUSION OF FIRE SAFETY STUDY FROM PUBLIC ACCESS Condition C14 explicitly excludes: The Fire Safety Study. The Emergency Plan. From public website disclosure. The community is expected to trust that adequate modelling exists without seeing it. Transparency is deliberately removed. This undermines procedural fairness. 8. PLANNING SECRETARY DISCRETION CLAUSES – SYSTEMIC WEAKNESS Repeated clauses: “Unless the Planning Secretary agrees otherwise.” These appear in: Decommissioning (B37). Strategy staging (C3–C6). Consultation waivers (C4). Infrastructure removal exceptions. This allows: Future dilution of safeguards. Non-consulted modification. Progressive weakening of environmental controls. This is not certainty. It is regulatory elasticity. 9. NO FINANCIAL ASSURANCE There is: No rehabilitation bond. No hazardous waste bond. No contamination remediation guarantee. No mandatory insurance quantum embedded in consent. The project life is 50 years. Battery replacement cycle 10 - 15 years. If operator insolvency occurs, liability reverts to the public. This violates intergenerational equity. 10. WASTE AND END-OF-LIFE Battery recycling facilities internationally have experienced catastrophic fires. There is no: Mandatory take-back agreement. Recycling pathway documentation. Waste tracking regime beyond generic EPA classification compliance. Long-term hazardous material contingency plan. “Classify waste appropriately” is not a lifecycle strategy. 11. ECONOMIC CLAIMS DO NOT OFFSET RISK The Assessment relies on: 100 temporary jobs. 1 operational job. $936,000 VPA. $208M capital investment. Capital expenditure is not public benefit. Risk exposure is public consequence. No modelling demonstrates that this facility materially improves affordability or long-term grid security. Even proponents of renewable modelling have acknowledged exclusions in ISP integration cost treatment. The Commission must assess risk on its own merits — not on energy transition narratives. 12. FLOOD + BATTERY = COMPOUND HAZARD The conditions require flood response planning. They do not: Prohibit operation during flood. Mandate elevated siting above climate-adjusted projections. Require battery isolation during inundation. Water intrusion is a known thermal runaway trigger. Compound risk is understated. 13. THE DPHI ASSESSMENT – A CRITICAL FAILURE The DPHI assessment: Treats emerging high-density chemical storage as routine industrial development. Relies on outdated hazardous industry thresholds. Defers unknown risks to post-consent studies. Minimises global mega-battery fire precedent. Ignores cyber-physical threat. Fails to require independent verification. Concentrates future discretion in the Planning Secretary. Excludes critical safety documents from public scrutiny. This is not rigorous planning. It is administrative facilitation. 14. PUBLIC INTEREST TEST Public interest requires: Transparent hazard modelling. Independent peer review. Financial assurance. Environmental protection certainty. Cybersecurity safeguards. Flood resilience. Contamination bonds. Genuine precaution. None are fully secured here. 15. CONCLUSION The proposed conditions are: Generic. Deferred. Discretion-laden. Non-transparent. Financially unsecured. Technically incomplete. They do not make the project safe. They postpone risk resolution. They assume best-case outcomes. The Commission should not endorse an approval framework that: Admits regulatory knowledge gaps, Ignores documented mega-scale battery fire consequences, Provides no contamination bond, Withholds safety studies from the public, And allows safeguards to be weakened administratively. The only defensible decision, consistent with ESD and s4.15, is refusal.

25651

Redacted

04/03/2026

Object

Website

This submission raises serious concern that local residents are largely unaware of this modification, despite the site being approximately 4 kilometres from the Mater Hospital. There has been no meaningful community notification, no public meeting, and no proactive engagement to ensure that those living and working in the surrounding area understand what is now proposed. A modification of this scale, particularly one involving additional infrastructure and altered operational impacts, should not proceed quietly through administrative channels without genuine public awareness and participation. It appears that the current approach favours minimal visibility, where the fewer objections received the easier it becomes to smooth the project through the approval process. That may be procedurally convenient, but it does not reflect best practice in transparent planning or community engagement. Residents cannot object to what they do not know about. The absence of clear, accessible communication undermines confidence in the integrity of the process and raises legitimate concern that community impact is being treated as secondary to expediency. The modification has potential implications for nearby residents, including increased noise from equipment, expanded operational footprint, and concerns regarding exposure to electrical infrastructure and perceived radiation impacts. Whether these risks are ultimately assessed as low or significant, the community has the right to be informed and to have those matters independently examined. Without proper exhibition and direct notification, it is impossible to claim that local residents have been afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to understand and respond to the true impacts of this proposal.

25656

New South Wales 2365

04/03/2026

Object

Website

Cease and Desist Steel River East BESS SSD-77450458 now. Steel River ?? Huh ?? Hunter is it ?? Hunter River is it? Clean up your act, gov.au Federal State and Local. Ban BESS. You should have by now. Haven't you seen the new ad on TV. View Fireblasta advertisements. First viewed TODAY ! Don't leave Lithium Ion batteries unattended. View the Ad. Cease and Desist 26th December Cause of Fire - Lithium Ion batteries The Danger is Real Don't Risk It Says the ad for Fireblaster. Havent you read about Moss Landing BESS Fires nb Fires, resulting in Evacuation of local community? I Demand an Immediate Moratorium on BESS in Australia. I know why. Why don't you, gov.au Federal State and Local. First page search says why. Who are you Listening to, eh? Tech Billionaires is it? Uh-oh. They No Care for Country nor you, Aussies. They really don't Care about You, Aussies. I Demand an Immediate Moratorium on BESS in Australia, and add Lithium Ion batteries going ON homes of ignorant Australians fooled by gov.au Federal State and Local hey. What do you do? Demand the Immediate Cessation of gov.au Federal State and Local simply because they No Care To The All On Country Lands Waterways and Communities Australian and World's. No such thing as clean energy. Clean was always about cleaning up the Environment. For your own information look up All the information is there about BESS and Lithium Ion batteries yet STILL you plan them, gov.au Federal State and Local. How do you Get away with it? You do. You cannot cover a BESS with a Fireblasta. What are you going to Do when they catch on fire? Well? What? Alert the entire city of Newcastle? Have you? You need to. You haven't have you. How Dare You All. Search this:- Search Assist The Moss Landing fire occurred on January 16, 2025, at the Vistra Energy Storage Facility, which housed one of the world's largest battery storage systems. The fire was caused by a thermal runaway in lithium-ion batteries, resulting in significant environmental concerns due to the release of toxic metals into the surrounding area. https://www.facebook.com/61550817174792/posts/scientists-confirm-heavy-metal-contamination-after-the-january-2025-moss-landing/122269056344027239/ https://www.dankolaw.com/blog/the-2025-vistra-battery-fire-in-moss-landing-one-year-later/ https://www.siliconvalley.com/2025/02/14/monterey-county-residents-sue-vistra-others-for-damages-due-to-moss-landing-battery-fire/ Are Lithium Ion batteries toxic? Yes they are, and you plan MORE????? Why ????? You need the Sack dont you. You're a Risk to every Australian yes you are. Yes you are.

25661

Redacted

04/03/2026

Object

Website

BESS infrastructure is a dangerous fire hazard. It is noisy, ugly and too close to a hospital.

25666

Redacted

04/03/2026

Object

Website

These projects are a dangerous environmental hazard.

25671

Redacted

04/03/2026

Object

Website

These projects are destroying not only our environment, but our economy. Approving such destructive projects will set our future generations up for financial debt and failure.

25676

Redacted

04/03/2026

Object

Website

These projects are dangerous. If this catches fire and lives are lost, all who approved this will be answering at a coronial inquest.

25561

New South Wales 2298

03/03/2026

Support

Website

I support the proposal by Ausgrid to develop the 200 megawatt Steel River East Battery Energy Storage System (BESS; development application SSD-77450458) including its associated infrastructure and connection to the electricity grid. It has been proposed in an ideal site, close to the city of Newcastle and within an existing industrial estate that has established connections to the grid with all necessary electrical infrastructure. Importantly, this site is located on remediated land that was filled and capped after closure of the BHP Steelworks, which is exactly the location where this type of development should be located. As I understand it, this land cannot be used for residential purposes. The BESS also wouldn’t detract from the area’s character since its already an industrial estate. In my opinion, an essential benefit of choosing this site is that it will not use valuable land that could be used for agriculture or residential purposes, or where established forests provide valuable habitat and biodiversity. We must make decisions that use land for the most appropriate purpose, in this case BESS, and preserve relatively unspoiled land for homes, parks, conservation and agriculture. It is crucial that Newcastle and NSW continue to make progress on building a more sustainable energy and power system – stored excess energy by the BESS would do this by helping to reduce the strain on the electricity grid during times of peak demand or when renewable energy production is low. I live approximately 4 kilometres from the proposed BESS development. It is telling that of the 61 submissions objecting to the project, the closest was from 90 km away from the site!, whereas submissions supporting the project were from people located between 7 - 40 km from the site. I wholeheartedly agree with the Department’s assessment that the project would not result in significant negative impacts on the local community, or the environment, and that in fact it would result in benefits to the community by way of construction jobs and contributions to the Council, and to the State through capital investment. I look forward to a more sustainable future for Newcastle and the State through projects such as BESS that improve grid stability, energy security and reliability.

24761

New South Wales 2304

19/02/2026

Support

Website

I am writing in support of the Steel River East Battery Energy Storage System. I live and work in Mayfield, and this project will directly affect my local area and community. I am submitting my support in part because of the amount of misinformation that has been circulated in some sections of the media and on social media. As someone who lives and works here every day, I feel I have a clear and practical understanding of the environment and the challenges our community faces. From my perspective, the impact of this project is largely passive and necessary as part of the transition to a more reliable and sustainable energy future. Battery energy storage plays a critical role in supporting renewable energy by improving grid stability, reducing reliance on fossil fuels, and ensuring consistent supply. These systems are an essential part of modernising our infrastructure and preparing for the long-term energy needs of the community. Living in Mayfield, the effects of heavy industry are very real. Anyone who walks along Industrial Drive can see and experience the volume of truck traffic and the associated emissions. These trucks produce significant amounts of exhaust fumes, which impact local air quality. In addition, my home is directly affected by coal dust, which is a constant reminder of our current reliance on fossil fuels and the environmental impact that comes with it. Projects like the Steel River East Battery Energy Storage System represent an important step toward reducing that reliance. By enabling greater use of renewable energy and improving the efficiency of the electricity grid, battery storage systems help reduce the need for coal-fired generation and contribute to a cleaner environment. I also believe that this project aligns with the long industrial history of the Steel River area. The site has long been used for heavy industry, and transitioning it to support modern energy infrastructure is a logical and positive evolution of its use. Importantly, battery energy storage systems operate quietly, have minimal visual impact compared to many industrial uses, and do not produce emissions during operation. From my understanding, projects like this are designed with strong safety standards and regulatory oversight. Overall, I believe the Steel River East Battery Energy Storage System is a responsible and necessary project that will benefit both the local community and the broader energy network. It represents progress toward a cleaner, more sustainable future while making appropriate use of existing industrial land. Thank you for the opportunity to provide my submission.